The use of a differential game and an optimal control theoretic approach for computing danger zones for this particular problem is new. The space outside the danger zone is deemed provably safe, implying that during blunder situations, emergency evasive maneuvers starting from outside the zone are guaranteed to be safe within limits on the maneuver severity of both the blundering and evading aircraft. In addition, these zones can be computed online in real time with knowledge of the current state. The algorithm also provides the minimum runway spacings for independent approaches and the minimum longitudinal separation between aircraft for dependent approaches. The algorithm for computing the zones has been validatedwith over one million simulationruns, where the adjacent aircraft performed various blunder trajectories. The validation shows that the algorithm could successfully alert and prevent collisions in 100% of the simulations ran.
Introduction
Problem O PERATIONAL limitations exist in simultaneous approaches to airports with closely spaced parallel runways (less than 2500 ft separation).In instrument meteorologicalconditions (IMC), simultaneous approaches are disallowed, and the arrival rate is halved, resulting in delays and congestion. Currently, 28 airports in the United States, which include major ones such as San Francisco International Airport, are affected by this limitation. It is, therefore, bene cial to enable simultaneous approaches under such conditions; there is considerable current research focused on enabling such operations by developing airborne and ground-basedsystems, procedures, and associated communication links.
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In closely spaced parallel approaches (CSPA), safe operation is assuredif each aircraftstays out of two zones.One containsthe wake vortex of the adjacent aircraft, whereas the other is where a blunder of the adjacent aircraft could result in the separation between the two aircraftbecoming less than the minimum allowed, even when an emergency evasive maneuver (EEM) is conducted. The minimum lateral separation allowed is assumed to be 500 ft, and the event in which the minimum is violated is considered a collision. As in the literature, 7 this second zone is referred to as the danger zone. The blunder could be due to a number of factors, such as pilot error, ight-control actuator failure, localizer receiver system failure, and strong gusts. A safe EEM is, thus, de ned as one that does not lead to a collision. The determination and ef cient computation of the danger zone are addressed in this paper.
Previous Research
In this paper, "blunderer" denotes the blundering aircraft, and "evader" denotes the aircraft that must make the EEM.
In previous research such as the segmented AILS algorithm 2;14 and the algorithm by Landry and Pritchett, 10 the "turn and straighten out" nature of the blunder trajectory is speci ed a priori, and variation in speed is not considered. Also, they do not explicitly consider the safety of the EEM. Because the blunder trajectory is speci ed, there could be other blunder trajectories that could cause a collision that are not considered. In the MITRE 3 and MIT 5 algorithms, the danger zone is obtained through Monte Carlo simulation based on a set of speci c blunder trajectories. Similarly, unless the set of speci c blunder trajectories is very extensive, the worst-case blundertrajectoriesmay not be included.Besides,Monte Carlo techniques are generally computationally intensive of ine.
The approach in this paper determines the danger zones by considering all blundertrajectoriespermittedby a model and the bounds on the control inputs, and all EEM trajectories about the nominal EEM trajectory. The latter includes the differences of the actual EEM trajectory from the nominal one. The set of blunder trajectories considered is more extensive than those in the previous algorithms. Furthermore, variations in the EEM were not considered in previous algorithms. The solution of the danger zone is obtained by applying differential game and optimal control theories. This approach, therefore, provides conditions for which an EEM can be said to be provably safe. If the evader begins the EEM outside the danger zone, it is guaranteedthat a collisionwill not occur regardless of the sequence of control inputs chosen by both the blunderer and evader, as long as the controlinputs and model parametersare within the given bounds. In addition, this approach can be implemented online.
This paper buildson work presentedearlier at the Digital Avionics System Conference (DASC) in 2000 17 and at the AIAA Guidance, Navigation, and Control Conference (GNC) in 2001. 18 In the DASC paper, uncertainties in the evader's trajectory and uncertainties in the lateral speeds of both aircraft were not considered. Also, only nite durationsafety guaranteeswere considered.In the AIAA GNC paper, the implementation and validation of the algorithm were not included.
Assumptions and Results Overview
In this approach, three speci c EEMs are assumed. EEM 1 is to accelerate straight, EEM 2 is to accelerate and turn to 45 deg and then continueacceleratingstraight, and EEM 3 is to coast at constant speed and turn to 60 deg. In this paper,the results presentedare for an evader that is performing the approach on the right of the blunderer. Thus, the turns in the EEMs 1-3 are turns to the right (away from the blunderer).
With these EEMs, the resulting danger zone will be formed by three line segments each obtained using EEMs 1-3. The zone size is a function of the aircraft speeds, relative heading, and worstcase bounds on the variation of their speeds and turn rates from nominal. The evader performing the appropriate EEM outside the corresponding boundary will be guaranteed to be safe.
These danger zones can also be used to determine the minimum safe runway separation for independent approaches (where there is no restriction on the longitudinalseparation between aircraft pairs). For dependentapproaches,the danger zone can be used to determine the minimum longitudinalseparation (MLS) between aircraft pairs. During operations,the aircraft will operate within these minimums, and the danger zone will be computed online to alert the pilot or autopilot when to carry out the appropriate EEM in the event of blunders.
Three EEMs instead of a single EEM are used because a single EEM will not be optimal for all situations. If a single EEM without acceleration were considered, the case in which the evader is in front of a faster blunderer would not be safe. If a single EEM with acceleration were considered, the case in which the evader is to the rear of a slower blundererwould produce a very large MLS that may put the evader in the blunderer's wake.
The multiplicity of EEMs would appear to give rise to pilot training issues. However, this is not the case. For dependent approaches, the rear aircraft pilot has to be prepared to conduct only EEM 3 and the front aircraft pilot to conduct only EEM 2. (If only EEM 2 is used to form the front boundary of the danger zone, this can be done without having an impact on the MLS.) For independent approaches, EEM 2 could be used to form the whole boundary of the danger zone; this will, however, increase the size of the zone laterally, but would addressthe training issue. Nevertheless,the complete 3-EEM danger zone will be presented in this paper. EEM 3 is safe for an inde nite duration only if the blunderer turns to a lesser heading or turns slower than the evader. Otherwise, EEM 3 is guaranteedto be safe only up to the end of the EEM, which is when it completes the 60-deg turn. For blunders that are due to localizer receiver system failure, pilot overcorrecting on hitting a gust, or a pilot mistaking the runway the pilot is supposed to land on, the blunderer's heading change will likely be less than that in EEM 3. Thus, EEM 3 will suf ce. For a more aggressive blunder, such as when the pilot aborts the approach, but turns in the direction of the adjacent aircraft, EEM 3 will suf ce if there are procedures and displays to indicate to the blundering pilot his error and that he corrects his maneuver within the duration in which EEM 3 guarantees safety. For a very aggressive blunder in which the blunderer turns through a large angle and "pursues" the evader, such as could occur in a mechanical failure in the ight-control actuators, EEM 3 will not suf ce. An adaptive algorithm used in conjunction with EEM 3 might provide protection. This adaptive algorithm could be a real-time trajectory adviser [such as the modi ed traf c alert and collision avoidance system (TCAS) with lateral advisories]that recommends the trajectory required to avoid a collision. The recommendation would be based on a prediction of the blunderer's trajectory.
Danger Zone Computation
As with previous research, state information of each aircraft is assumed to be available from either a local-area augmentation system (LAAS) 2 or a wide-area augmentation system (WAAS) 6 and transmitted to the other aircraft through an automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) 19 datalink. The EEM is open-loop safe in that no state information of the blunderer is needed during the EEM.
Solution Overview
The approach for computing the boundary of the danger zone is as follows (Fig. 1): 1) Fix a nominal EEM as an idealized trajectory consisting of a straight segment (to account for the time lag to achieve the required bank angle and for pilot response delay) and an arc segment. The nominal EEM is chosen to be an approximation of the actual trajectory of the evader. The uncertainty bounds in forward and lateral speed, and the turn rate of the evader, are chosen so that the actual trajectory will be contained within this representation.
2) For this EEM, determinethe end conditionsof the computation, which are the relative position and orientation between blunderer and evader (terminal states) when a collision has just occurred.
3) Determine using optimal control techniques the worst-case control inputs required of both the blunderer and evader to drive the relative position and orientation between blunderer and evader to these end conditions,and minimize either one of the following cost functions depending on the solution sought: a) Minimize the time to collision (game of degree). b) Minimize the separationdistanceat termination(game of kind). 4) Compute (analytically, using these worst-case control inputs) the corresponding blunderer and evader state trajectory.
5) Obtain the unsafe boundary from the analytical solutions of the state propagation by repeating steps 2-5 over the space of permissible end conditions. 
Reference Frame and Mathematical Model
In CSPA, the aircraft follow similar glide paths. They are, therefore, minimally separated in the vertical dimension.It would suf ce to consider motion in the horizontal plane if the worst-case control input bounds are chosen to include three-dimensional maneuvers. The reference frame from the work of Prasad et al. 20 is chosen (Fig. 2) . The worst-case control inputs of each aircraft can then be solved separately. The origin of the reference frame coincides with the blunderer position at termination and the x axis passes through the evader position at termination.
The position of the aircraft with respect to the reference frame is given by x i and y i , where the subscript i represents the aircraft, b for blunderer and e for evader.¯i refers to the heading of aircraft i as measured from the x axis in a counterclockwise direction.
A set of relative system coordinates is r , µ , and Ã i . As shown in Fig. 2 , they are, respectively, the distance between the two aircraft, the angle of the line joining the two aircraft as measured in a counterclockwise direction from a line parallel to the x axis, and the heading of aircraft i measured from the line joining the two aircraft in a counterclockwise direction.
Another set of relative coordinates of the evader with respect to the blunderer are x r D x e ¡ x b , y r D y e ¡ y b , and¯r D¯e ¡¯b. The y r axis is in the direction of v b .
The control inputs of each aircraft are v i , u i , and ±! i . They are, respectively,the forward speed, the lateral speed, and the variations in turn rate about the nominal turn rate of aircraft i . Finally, the subscript f attached to a state variable such as in¯b f refers to the state at termination.
The equations of motion for each aircraft are given as
The bounds on the control inputs are given as
The control inputs can vary within these bounds instantaneously. Instantaneous switches will not occur in actual aircraft state dynamics. This assumption will, thus, be conservative. For the blunderer,! b D 0 and ±! b represents the variation in turn rate that is bounded equally in both the left and right directions. For the evader, ! e is the nominal turn rate in the evasive maneuver, and ±! e represents the variation in the turn rate from the nominal. Equations encapsulating the relative dynamics are given as
The two different sets of states of the relative system [.x r ; y r ;¯r / and .r; Ã b ; Ã e /] are chosen in the computation. The rst set is used for presenting the danger zones with respect to the blunderer, whereas the second is used to derive the worst-case control inputs. Such a choice will result in an easier formulation for nding the worst-case control inputs.
Terminal Conditions
Recall that a collision occurs when the two aircraft are less than 500 ft apart. Thus, the terminal surface, which is the surface onto which the states are driven at the end of the game, is given as
In differential game terms, the surface can be divided into the usable part (UP) and the non-UP. The boundary between these two surfaces is designated the Boundary of the UP (BUP). Only the trajectoriesending on the BUP and the UP are of interest here. They are de ned as
Solving for the Worst-Case Control Inputs
Two different games with different cost functions are considered in this problem. One is with only a terminal cost, and the other is with only a running cost. In the terminal cost game (or the game of kind), the blunderer and evader aim to minimize cooperativelytheir separation at the end of the game, that is, when the states reach the terminal surface T . In the running cost game (or the game of degree), the blunderer and evader aim to drive the states cooperativelyto the terminal surface in minimum time. Thus, the cost functions are the terminal cost game [Eq. (8a)],
or the running cost game,
where L and G are the running cost and terminal cost, respectively, and t f denotes the time at termination. The combined cost function is, thus,
The boundaries of the danger zone are computed from the game of kind as far as possible. In cases of EEM 3, where the blunderer turns as fast or faster than the evader, the boundary is computed from the game of degree.
When no acceleration of the evader is considered (EEM 3), the Hamiltonian is given by
From Hamilton's equations, the following equations for the costates p r , p Ã b , and p Ã e are obtained:
where
The nal conditions (denoted by the subscript f ) on the costates are
Note that p r f is always positive on the UP. Solving Eq. (11) with Eq. (12) gives
The control inputs that minimize the cost function for both games may now be solved for. These are denoted the worst-case control inputs because any other choice of control inputs within the bounds can only improve the outcome of the game from the evader's perspective. As opposed to the min-max solution in a differentialgame problem, 20 ;21 a "min-min" problem is solved here, where the evader also tries to "assist" the blunderer in minimizing the cost function. This is used to guarantee safety even in the face of uncertainty in the model and maneuver, with respect to the evader. The worst-case control inputs are, thus, found by solving min fvb ;ub ;±!b ;ve;ue ;±!e g fH C Lg D 0
Substituting Eqs. (10) and (13) into Eq. (14) gives
When Eq. (1) is used and it is noted that the terms relating to each aircraft can be separated, the following providesthe worst-case control inputs:
ue ;±!e g fv e cos.¯e/ C u e sin.¯e/ C y e ±! e C y e ! e g
As mentioned earlier, the worst-case control inputs can be solved for each aircraft independently of the other. This is the advantage of analyzing the problem using the chosen reference frame and the states r, Ã b , and Ã e .
For EEM 1 and 2, acceleration of the evader can be modeled by making v e a state variable with P v e D a e , where a e , a new control input, is the accelerationof the evader. The worst-case controlinputs can be worked out similarly. The result turns out to be the same with a e D a min e for all of the cases in this problem.
Obtaining Danger Zones
The worst-case trajectory for the blunderer is found by stepping backward in time from the position and heading (¯b f ) at termination, using the equations of the trajectory with the worst-case control inputs. The worst-case trajectory ending at¯e f for the evader is similarly obtained.
Blunderer
To be consistent with the reference frame in Fig. 2 , the worstcase blunderer trajectories must end at the origin. A few sample worst-case trajectories ending at 0 ·¯b f · 180 are shown in Fig. 3 . Those ending at ¡180 ·¯b f · 0 are symmetric about the x axis. The arrows in Fig. 3 represent the worst-case control inputs of the blunderer as it travels along the trajectories.
Evader
For EEM 3, the worst-case evader trajectoriesare shown in Fig. 4 . Again, to be consistent with the reference frame, the trajectories all end at (500, 0), which is also on the terminal surface T . The nominal turn rate is set at a certain value (¡! e ). This correspondsto a turn to the right as the evasive maneuver. Recall that, in this paper, the case of an evader performing the approach to the right of the blunderer is considered.The trajectoriesin Fig. 4 are, therefore, all turning right and are not symmetric about the x axis, unlikethose of the blunderer. Also, note that Eq. (16) shows that the evader's worst-case control inputs are exactly the opposite of the blunderer's. Thus, the control input switches, as shown in Fig. 4 , occur at the same points as the blunderer, but are of an opposite nature. The next step is to obtain the boundary of the danger zone. The boundary is generated by sweeping over all blunderer worst-case trajectories. For each blunderer worst-case trajectory, the matching evader worst-case trajectory that satis es both the initial and terminal conditions on the relative heading¯r is found. In most cases, r can be solved independently of the relative position x r , y r . The boundary can, thus, be computed analyticallywithout numerical integration or search. However,¯r cannot be solved independently only for a small number of cases, when the worst-case trajectory involves a turn rate switch that is a function of y b or y e . In this case, the solution involves a numerical search.
For a given relative heading, the x ¡ y space is divided into the danger and EEM safe zones. In the danger zone, there exists blunderer and evader trajectorieswithin the bounds on the control inputs that would lead to a collision. In the EEM safe zone, all combinations of blunderer and evader trajectories within the bounds on the control inputs do not lead to a collision. Thus, provably safe evasive maneuvers can be effected outside the danger zone, starting from the given relative heading.
Results
This section presents the danger zones for three cases, namely, the baseline case, the sharp EEM case and the fast evader case. These three cases represent the range of cases expected in CSPA. In the baseline case, the speeds and turn rates of the blunderer and evader are similar. The parameters of the baseline case are as follows. For the blunderer, the forward and lateral speeds, and turn The danger zones presentedare for a 0-deg relative heading.Also, only the boundary on the right of the blunderer are shown. This represents a CSPA with the evader on the right of the blunderer. Recall also that these danger zones can be computed in real time.
In all cases (Fig. 5) , segments 1 and 2 are computed assuming EEM 1 and 2, respectively.In both EEMs, the evaderhas a minimum acceleration of 1 kn/s. Segment 3 is computed assuming EEM 3. Where accelerationof the evaderis involvedin the EEM, the forward speed of the evader becomes a state variable and the acceleration the control input. The forward speed will change according to the worst-case acceleration, which is the minimum acceleration in all of the cases presented.
After studying these results obtained through mathematical analysis, intuitive explanations can be given.
Baseline Case
The danger zone boundary for the baseline case is shown in Fig. 5a . The corresponding worst-case trajectories that generated the points i, ii, and iii on the boundary are shown in Figs. 6a, 6b , and 6c, respectively. Figure 6 shows the worst-case control input switches, which are somewhat intuitive in hindsight. For example, in Fig. 6b , on crossing the blunderer's "future" worst-case path, the evader switches its turn rate from ¡! max e C ±! e to ¡! max e ¡ ±! e , that is, it initially turns as slowly as it can and then turns as fast as it can. The explanation would be that when the evader is to the right of the blunderer, by turning as slowly as it can, it gets itself nearer to the blunderer's path. When the evader is to the left of the blunderer, by turning as fast as it can, it gets itself back toward the blunderer's path. In addition to the turn rate switch, there is a lateral motion switch when the heading of the evader is parallel to the straight part of the blunderer's trajectory. By "slipping" leftward before the switch point and rightward after the switch point, the evader's velocity in the direction parallel to the straight part of the blunderer's trajectory is effectively reduced, thus, having a slowing down effect on the evader's motion. Because the evader terminates at the front of the blunderer, the slowing down of the evader naturally minimizes the distance between the two aircraft at termination. Though the control input switches now seem intuitive, it would have been very dif cult to predict them without the mathematical analysis. This EEM is obviously not optimal because the evader returns to the blunderer's path. The optimal heading for the evader would have been less than 45 deg. Nevertheless,to simplify the EEM procedure, a nite number of EEMs is chosen, each being suboptimal for some range of conditions.
Sharp EEM Case
The danger zone for the Sharp EEM case is shown in Fig. 5b . Note that the danger zone is smaller than that of Fig. 5a . More importantly,the solutionfrom the game of kind appearsin segment3. This means that safety can be guaranteed inde nitely at these parts. As indicated in Fig. 5b, a part of segment 3 is generated from worstcase trajectoriesthat end on the BUP. Recall that, in these cases, the distance between the two aircraft at termination begin to increase even if they continue to use their worst-case control inputs. This could, thus, guarantee safety inde nitely. This case shows that to have inde nite safety guarantees for a blunderer that is in front, the evader should turn more aggressively than the blunderer.
Fast Evader Case
The danger zone for the fast evader case is shown in Fig. 5c . The main difference compared to the baseline case is that the blunder zone is shifted rearward. It otherwise has the same characteristics as the baseline case.
Implementation Issues
The algorithm has been implemented both in detailed simulation, as well as for generalaviation researchaircraft.The additionalissues addressed in the implementation are described as follows.
Communication Dropouts
It is reasonableto expect communicationdropoutsover a wireless link. The algorithm must be able to take into account such occurrences. There is a convenient and simple approach to handling this. The algorithm takes into account a delay before the start of the evasive maneuver; if the wireless link update rate is r hertz and if n consecutive updates are lost, the delay can be increased by n=r s to account for the dropouts. This effectively means that if the blunder starts at the beginning of the dropouts, the evasive maneuver (if required) is still guaranteed to be safe. Naturally, as the duration of consecutivedropoutsincrease,the danger zone will grow and could, at a certain point, lead to an encroachment over the evader.
Simpli cation
As it is, the danger zone boundary, for the most part, is given in the form of a series of parameterizedexplicit analyticalexpressions. (Only one case involves a bisection search algorithm.) Discontinuous switches (representing the discontinuous worst-case control switches) occur within the series. As such, a simple expression explicitly giving the boundary itself cannot be obtained. On the other hand, it is observed that the danger zone can be contained within a polygon. Because some parts of the danger zone boundary consist of relatively straight parts separated by sharp corners, about six straight lines suf ce in describing the polygon with only a slight overapproximation,as shown in Fig. 7 . The algorithm for checking encroachment, thus, reduces to checking that the evader is outside at least one of the sides of the polygon.
This check can be easilycoded and can be performedvery quickly, thus, facilitating the online implementation of the algorithm.
Sensor Inaccuracy
Sensor inaccuracy can be easily accounted for if WAAS-like characteristicsare assumed. The minimum operationalperformance standards for WAAS 22 specify the computation of the horizontal protection level (HPL) of the differentially corrected navigation solution, which must be met at a probabilityof 99.99999%.This means that the true error must not exceed the protection level more than once in 10 7 s. The relative horizontal position error e between the two aircraft can, at worst, be twice the HPL with a probability of displays (for aircraft on the right) . 15 99.99999%. The boundaries can, thus, be pushed out of the danger zone by a distance of e to account for the sensor inaccuracy. In the algorithm, this can easily be achieved by pushing out the sides of the polygon, as shown in Fig. 7 .
Cockpit Display
To display the danger zones to the pilot, Jennings et al. 15 developed a cockpit display, as shown in Fig. 8 , in which the algorithm was implemented in C using OpenGL and Open GVS (Quantum3D) graphics libraries on an 800-MHz Intel processor with nVidia GeForce3 graphics card. The upper half of the display is a three-dimensionalperspectivesyntheticview, and the lower half is a map view. The danger zone is shown in the latter view as both a polygon (as in Fig. 7) and colored strips. Only the colored strips would be displayed to the pilot. The polygon is shown here only for illustrative purposes. The colored strips indicate where the danger zone overlaps the own ship approach corridor. They are color coded to indicate the pilot response delay used in the danger zone computation. Here, the center strip, which is color coded red, represents the danger zone for a 2-s pilot response delay. The outer strips, which are color coded yellow, represent the danger zone for a 4-s pilot response delay. The pilot ying outside the yellow strip (Fig. 8a ) will have 4 s to respond with a coast and turn to a 60-deg EEM when a blunder occurs (Fig. 8b) to be safe.
In sum, the schematic for the implementation of the algorithm is shown in Fig. 9 . The algorithm takes speed and heading information from both aircraft and computes the danger zone polygon. With the position information from both aircraft, it then performs the check and activates the necessary EEM, if required. During the EEM, speed and heading information of the blunderingaircraft will not be required.
MLS
The MLS represents the separation distance at which, under normal operating conditions,the danger zone boundary of each aircraft would not encroach on the position of the adjacent aircraft.
It is assumed that, under normal conditions, the heading of each aircraft is within §5 deg of the nominal, so that the relative heading between a pair of aircraft is at worst §10 deg. This assumption is based on ight simulation data on coordinated parallel runway approaches.
14 Also, it is assumed that the approach paths are rotated outward such that, under normal conditions, the lateral separation between aircraft is always greater than the runway spacing, less 200 ft. In addition, the same parameters used in the validation of the algorithm (next section) are used.
Two approachscenariosare considered.The rst representsa pair of General Aviation aircraft conducting CSPA at a nominal ground speed of 100 kn, and the second represents a pair of Commercial Jet aircraft at 150 kn.
A buffer of 200 ft is added to the resulting separation and also the result is rounded off to the next one hundredfeet. The bufferservesto allow variation in the longitudinal separation without triggering an EEM. The variation will be largely due to imperfect stationkeeping.
The results for a pilot response delay of 2 and 3 s are given in Table 1 for the lateral runway spacingsof 750, 1700, and 2500 ft, respectively. The pilot response delays chosen are speci cally significant for CSPA. Simulation studies of parallel approaches in IMC 13 revealed a mean response time of 0.71 s with a standard deviation of 0.22 s. These are signi cantly lower than the 5-s delay typically assumed for TCAS. However, because the nal approach is a brief interval during which concentration can be maintained, short response times are possible. 16 Because of the danger zone width, there is no MLS limitation for the 2500-ft runway case, except for the Commercial Jet scenario with a pilot response delay of 3 s. No limitation on MLS implies that independent approaches with the algorithm can be conducted. Where the MLS is nonzero, it exactly corresponds to the required separation for dependent approaches. Also, it is observed that the MLS is sensitive to pilot response delay. An increase in delay by 1 s causes the MLS to increase between 200-500 ft. The effect of poorer ADS-B reliability or lower ADS-B rate would essentially be the (Table 1) .
Validation
The implementation of the algorithm has been validated through 1,106,091 simulations with a Piper Saratoga as blunderer and a Cessna Caravan as evader. This choice of aircraft is due to the accessibility to these aircraft for ight tests and ight-test data, yet the motivation of the algorithm is toward commercial aircraft. The simulation is performed in three dimensions, using nonlinear dynamic models whose basic control inputs are desired roll angle, lift coef cient, and thrust.
The algorithm is run online on the Cessna Caravan. It computes the danger zone boundary around the Piper Saratoga and checks the Cessna Caravan's position with respect to the boundary. On encroachment, the Cessna Caravan is made to evade according to the part of the boundarythat encroachesit. The horizontalseparation between the two aircraft at the closest point of approach, together with the result of each run, is recorded.
The objective of the simulation runs is to validate the algorithm with realistic aircraft models under realistic conditions involving turbulence, sensor noise, and ADS-B drop outs. Although in the simulation it is necessary to choose only a nite number of blunder trajectories, recall that the analysis considered all blunder trajectories permitted by the model and bounds on control inputs.
The validation approach is adapted from Honeywell's work. With regards to the evader, the simulation runs consist of the following scenarios: 1) ground speeds of 100, 115, and 130 kn; 2) down range of ¡3000 to 3000 ft at 200-ft intervals; 3) altitude of ¡1000 to 1000 ft at 500-ft intervals; and 4) pilot response delays of 1, 2, and 3 s.
Other variations include: 1) runway spacings of 750, 1700, and 2500 ft; 2) wind conditions that are either calm (¾ D 2 ft/s) or turbulent (¾ D 6 ft/s), in which ¾ refers to standard deviation; and 3) ADS-B reliability of 50, 70, and 90%.
The runs are made only if the evader is initially outside the danger zone. ADS-B is assumed to operate at 1 Hz. The position and velocity measurement errors were simulated by a normally distributed random number generator with standard deviations of 6.5 ft and 1 ft/s, respectively.
The mathematical model used for the aircraft is a point mass nonlinear dynamic model adapted from one developed for a NASA Air Traf c Control simulation. 23 The model is more realistic than the one used in the analysis. To obtain the speed and turn rate boundsrequiredby the algorithm, simulationsusing this model were conducted under the simulated turbulent wind condition. From the resulting trajectories, the longitudinal and lateral speed variations were estimated to be §5 kn. The maximum turn rate of the blunderer is estimated to be 6.5 deg/s. This corresponds to the turn rate achieved at a bank angle of 30 deg. For the EEMs involving a turn, the evader is assumed to bank to a maximum of 45 deg. The simulations show that these trajectories can be described by the kinematic model in Eq. (1) by a delay of 2.5 s, followed by a turn rate of 9.0 § 0.5 deg/s. Each run consists of two subruns: one without the algorithm running and the other with the algorithm running.The result of each run is categorized according to Table 2 . The simulation and algorithm are coded in C using Microsoft Visual CCC version 6.0 and are run on a Dell Pentium 3 personal computer.
Histograms of the horizontal separation at the closest point of approach (HSCPA) for the three runway spacingsare shown in Fig. 10 . (See also Table 3 .) As expected, the HSCPA is always greater than the 500-ft minimum. Further numerical results are given in Table 2 . This validates the algorithm against the chosen set of blunder trajectories and shows that it works for all of the runway spacings chosen.
As presented in the Honeywell approach (see Refs. 2 and 24), three metrics are used to evaluate the validation results. They are the probabilities of successful alert (SA), unnecessary alert (UA), and collision given an alert (CGA). The results and the corresponding formula are given in Table 4 . The SA and CGA metric results are as expected because the EEM worst-case turn rate is faster than the blunderer maximum allowed turn rate. The UA metric results appear to be high. However, these alerts should be considered necessary because they are raised by blunders that have the potential to cause a collision, should their trajectories be modi ed midcourse. The blunders that were correctly rejected (CR) are those that did not have the potential as yet to cause a collision. It is more important to ensure that false alarms (FAs) do not occur during normal aircraft approaches with normal ight technical error (FTE). Such approaches could have been used in the validation. However, because it is evident that the algorithm will never raise an alert if the aircraft maintain the MLS, which is computed based on normal FTE, the validation was primarily focused on approaches with blunders.
The algorithm has been successfully demonstrated to work according to expectations and is able to guarantee safety as long as the blunder trajectories are captured by the model and are within the bounds on the control inputs assumed.
Conclusions
A differential game and optimal control theoretic approach for computing the dangerzones for CSPA has been presented.This is the rst time this approach has been applied to this particular problem. Compared to previous algorithms, this enables a more extensive range of blunder trajectoriesand variations in the evader emergency evasive maneuver to be considered. This approach guarantees that safe emergency evasive maneuvers can be conducted if effected outside the danger zone and if the maneuver severity of both the blunderer and evader are within the bounds assumed in computing the danger zone. In addition, this algorithm can be implemented online in real time.
The danger zone computation results can also be used to obtain the minimum runway spacing required for safe independent approaches with the algorithm running as the blunder alerting system. For dependent approaches,the results can be used to obtain the safe minimum longitudinal separation required, also with the algorithm running as the blunder alerting system. As long as the aircraft operate within the FTE used to compute the danger zones, no FAs would be raised. Further analysis shows that reduction in the MLS can be achieved with higher ADS-B rates or by automating the EEM.
The implementation issues, including a cockpit display, are addressed, and the algorithm has been validated with over one million simulation runs where the adjacent aircraft performed various blunder trajectories. The validation shows that the algorithm could successfully alert and prevent collisions in 100% of the simulationsran.
As part of future work, the online computation of the algorithm will be demonstratedin a ight experimentinvolving10-ft wingspan uncrewed aircraft, and the cockpit display of the danger zone will be evaluated through piloted simulations. 15 
